Abstract. We present three security claims for iterated MAC functions. Next, we propose Alred, a construction method for MAC functions based on a block cipher that has provable security in the absence of internal collisions. We apply this construction to AES resulting in two MAC functions: Alpha-MAC and Pelican. We provide a model for describing different types of internal collisions in Alred and provide evidence that the security claims we propose are usable for MAC functions that use the Alred construction. Finally, we provide a motivation for the security claims that accompany Pelican.
Introduction
Message Authentication Codes (MAC functions) are symmetric primitives, used to ensure authenticity of messages. They take as input a secret key and the message and in some cases a diversifier, and produce as output a short tag.
Basically, there are three approaches for designing MACs. The first approach is to design a new primitive from scratch, as for instance MAA [1] , UMAC [2] and Poly1305-AES [3] . This approach allows to optimize the security-performance trade-off. The second approach is to define a new mode of operation for existing primitives. In this category, we firstly have numerous variants based on the CBC encryption mode for block ciphers, e.g. CBC-MAC [4] , OMAC [5] , and RMAC [6] . Secondly, there are the designs based on an unkeyed hash function: NMAC, HMAC [7] . Finally, one can design new MACs using components from existing primitives, e.g. MDx-MAC [8] . The Alred construction falls in the last category: it builds MAC function using the round transformation of a block cipher.
Related literature
The Alred construction and its first instantiations Alpha-MAC and Pelican were presented in [9, 10] . Shortly thereafter, the AES-based stream cipher LEX was presented [11] . Interestingly, the designer of LEX arrived independently at a design with striking similarities. After an initialization phase consisting of one application of AES, LEX uses one round of the AES as its state update function. After every update of the internal state, 32 bits of key stream are produced by extracting by the injection layout of Alpha-MAC (see Section 5.1).
Minematsu and Tsunoo extended Alred to produce two provably secure MAC constructions:
PC-MAC and MT-MAC [12] . When used with AES, their constructions have the same performance as Alpha-MAC and Pelican, but use more keying material. Simplício et al. based a parallelizable MAC on the Alred construction called MARVIN [13] .
Huang et al. construct second preimages and internal collisions for Alpha-MAC when the internal state or the key are known [14] . There are no implications for the security of Alpha-
MAC.
Yuan et al. present forgery attacks on Alred and Alpha-MAC in [15] and Wang et al. on
Pelican, PC-MAC and MT-MAC in [16] . These attacks all make use of inner collisions. None of these attacks contradict the Alpha-MAC and Pelican security claims.
Biryukov et al. present a side-channel collision attack on Alpha-MAC [17] . Although sidechannel attacks are principally a feature of an implementation rather than the MAC function itself, they also introduce a type of differentials that was not considered in the original security analysis of Alpha-MAC. We discuss these differentials in Section 6.
Structure of this paper
In Section 2, we discuss iterative MAC functions and their Achilles' heel: internal collisions. In Section 3, we improve the security claims given in [9] for iterated MAC functions, addressing the issue of internal collisions. In Section 4, we present Alred, a construction method for block cipher based MAC functions. In Section 5 we illustrate the construction method by two examples: Alpha-MAC and Pelican. In Section 6 we provide a new framework for describing the different types of internal collisions in MAC functions based on the Alred construction. In Section 7 we give a new analysis of the behaviour of the expected maximum collision probability in an idealized case.
In Section 8 we motivate the security claims accompanying Pelican. We conclude in Section 9.
Iterative MAC functions and their internal collisions
The basic property of a MAC function is that it provides an unpredictable mapping between messages and the tag for someone who does not know the key. We find the following design objectives in [18, Table 9 .2]:
1. Key non-recovery: the expected complexity of any key recovery attack is of the order of 2 ℓ MAC function executions.
Computation resistance:
there is no forgery attack with probability of success above max(2 −ℓ , 2 −ℓ ).
Here ℓ is the key length and ℓ the tag length. By forgery one means the generation of a messagetag pair ( , ) using only information on pairs ( , ) with ∕ = for all .
Iterative MAC functions
An iterative MAC function operates on a working variable, called the state. The message is split up in a sequence of message blocks and after an initialization the message blocks are sequentially injected into the state by an iteration function. Then a final transformation may be applied to the state resulting in the tag. At least one of the initialization, iteration function and final transformation is keyed.
Iterative MAC functions can be implemented in hardware or software with limited amount of working memory, irrespective of the length of the input messages. They have the disadvantage that different messages may be found that lead to the same value of the state before the final transformation. This is called an internal collision [19] . More generally, internal collisions are a concern for all practical MAC functions, including hierarchic ones.
Internal collisions
Internal collisions can be used to perform forgery. Assume we have two messages 1 and 2 that result in an internal collision. Then for any string 3 the two messages 1 ∥ 3 and 2 ∥ 3 have the same tag value. So given the tag of any message 1 ∥ 3 , one can forge the tag of the message 2 ∥ 3 . Internal collisions can often be used to speed up key recovery as well [19] . If the number of bits in the state is , and the iteration function can be modeled as a random transformation, then one can expect to find a collision with about 2 /2 known pairs.
The presence of internal collisions makes that even the best iterative MAC function cannot fulfill the design objectives given above.
One approach to avoid the upper limit due to the birthday paradox in iterative MAC functions is diversification. The MAC function gets a third input that serves to diversify the MAC computation. This third input must be non-repeating or random. The method has several important drawbacks. First of all, not only the tag must be sent along with the message, but also this third parameter, typically doubling the overhead. In case of a random value, a random number generator must be implemented. Moreover, the workload of generating the random value should be taken into account in the performance evaluation of the primitive. In case of a non-repeating value the tag generation device must keep track of a counter. In some cases the randomization mechanism itself introduces subtle flaws [20] .
In this paper we adopt another approach to avoid internal collisions: we impose an upper bound on the number of tags that may be generated with a given key. If this upper bound is large enough it does not impose restrictions in actual applications.
Security claims
We propose here a set of three orthogonal security claims, that an iterative MAC function should satisfy to be called secure. The claims are formulated in terms of three dimension parameters:
the tag length ℓ , the key length ℓ and the capacity ℓ . The capacity is the size of the internal memory of an ideal iterative MAC function with equivalent resistance against internal collisions. A similar set of claims were first proposed in [9] , but we think that some improvements were needed. 
Key recovery
Claim 2 The probability of success of any key recovery attack with a computational effort equivalent to MAC function executions is not larger than 2 −ℓ .
This claim is also a classical security claim, used for both encryption algorithms and MAC functions.
Internal collisions
We propose a claim stating that for an attack consisting of calls to a MAC function instance with some unknown key, the success probability of generating inner collisions shall be lower than that of a generic attack on a MAC function with an internal state of ℓ bits, for the same total number of message bits.
Given the total number of message bits , the generic attack consists of constructing as many different bitstrings possible with total length , sending these strings as messages to the MAC function instance and observing whether there are messages with colliding tags. For simplicity we assume here that colliding tags imply an internal collision.
The probability of having an internal collision is equal to 1 minus the probability that the ( ) messages lead to ( ) different values in the final value of the internal state. If the size of the internal state is ℓ bits, the collision probability is given by 1
Iterated MAC functions typically operate on the message as sequences of blocks of some fixed length ℓ , where first padding is applied. Therefore we express our security claim with the total number of message blocks, rather than bits.
Claim 3 The probability of observing an inner collision in an instance of a MAC function with an unknown key by sending messages to it, where the total number of messages blocks is , is not
In the best case there are no attacks better than generic attacks and the capacity ℓ is equal to the number of bits of the state. In [9] this claim was originally formulated as follows:
The probability that an internal collision occurs in a set of ((adaptively) chosen message, tag) pairs, with < 2 ℓ /2 , is not above 1
In that formulation, there are problems with iterative MAC constructions based on an invertible iteration function. This can be seen as follows. We consider messages where all message blocks are equal. In a pure iterated construction, the iteration function becomes then a constant permutation, composed of a number of cycles. Each cycle gives rise to fixed points. The maximum length of a cycle of a permutation on a set of 2 elements equals 2 . It follows that if we iterate the permutation 2 ! times, then we obtain the identity transformation. Hence, a message consisting of a single block and a message consisting of followed by 2 ! times a block will always result in an internal collision. Since the original formulation of Claim 3 says nothing about the length of messages, we would have to conclude that the capacity equals zero for any invertible iteration function and for any value of the input.
The Alred construction
We describe here a way to construct a MAC function based on an iterated block cipher. The key length of the resulting MAC function is equal to that of the underlying block cipher. In our presentation, we call ℓ the block length of the MAC function, not to be confused with the block length of a block cipher used in its construction. For sake of simplicity, we assume that the block length of the block cipher equals the state size .
Definition
We distinguish a number of steps. First the message is padded and split in message blocks. After padding, the length of the message must be a multiple of ℓ bits, where ℓ is a characteristic of a component in the MAC function. The message blocks are applied to a state that is initialized using the key and that afterwards undergoes a final step, again using the key.
Message padding and splitting: Pad the message, for instance by means of padding method 2 in [4] : append a single 1 bit followed by the minimum number of 0 bits so that the resulting length is a multiple of ℓ bits. Split the result in message blocks 1 , 2 , . . . of ℓ bits each.
State initialization:
1. Initialize the state with the all-zero block.
2. Apply the block cipher to the state.
Chaining: for each message block perform an iteration:
1. Map the bits of the message block to an injection input that has the same dimensions as a sequence of round keys of the block cipher. We call this mapping the injection layout.
2. Apply a sequence of block cipher round functions to the state, with the injection input taking the place of the round keys.
Finalization:
1. Apply the block cipher to the state.
2. Truncation: the tag is the first ℓ bits of the state.
Let the message blocks be denoted by , the state after iteration by , the key by and the tag by . Let denote the iteration function, which consists of the combination of the injection layout and the sequence of block cipher round functions. Then we can write:
= Trunc(Enc( , ))
The construction is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case = 1. With this approach, the design of the MAC function is limited to the choice of the block cipher, the number of rounds per iteration , the injection layout and ℓ . The goal is to choose these such that the resulting MAC function fulfills the security claims for iterated MAC functions for some acceptable values of ℓ and ℓ .
Motivation
The block cipher application in the initialization prohibits off-line attacks to construct internal collisions. It also makes the difference propagation through the chaining phase, with its nonlinear iteration function, depend on the key. A remarkable feature of the Alred construction method is that the iteration function doesn't take a secret key as input. In fact, our analysis does not reveal any benefit following from making the iteration function depend on the key.
The computational efficiency of Alred depends on the length of the message blocks. Where in CBC based constructions for long messages there is one block cipher execution per block, Alred takes merely rounds per message block.
Note that for an adversary that has obtained the value of the initial state 0 for a given key, generating internal collisions typically becomes feasible. Therefore, it is essential that implementations protect the secrecy of state value, e.g., against side channel attacks [17].
Provability
An Alred MAC function is as strong as the underlying block cipher with respect to key recovery.
In the absence of internal collisions, it is resistant against forgery if the block cipher is resistant against ciphertext guessing.
Observation: The proofs we give are valid for any chaining phase that transforms 0 into final parameterized by a message. In the proofs we denote this by final = cf ( 0 , ).
This implies that the security of the underlying block cipher protects against forgery without internal collisions, even for the weakest function cf , e.g., a linear function.
Theorem 1. Every key recovery attack on Alred, requiring (adaptively) chosen messages, can be converted to a key recovery attack on the underlying block cipher, requiring + 1 adaptively chosen plaintexts.
Proof: Let be an attack requiring the tag values corresponding to the (adaptively) chosen messages , yielding the key. Then, the attack on the underlying block cipher works as follows. Proof: Let ℬ be an attack, not involving internal collisions, requiring the tag values corresponding to the (adaptively) chosen messages yielding a forged tag for the message . Then, the ciphertext guessing attack on the underlying block cipher works as follows.
Request
1. Request 0 = Enc( , 0), where '0' denotes the all-zero plaintext block.
2. For = 1 to , compute = cf ( 0 , ).
3. For = 1 to , request = Enc( , ).
Input the tag values Trunc( ) to
ℬ and obtain the tag for the message .
5. Compute = cf ( 0 , ).
6. If there is a for which = , then ℬ has generated an internal collision, which conflicts with the requirement on ℬ. Otherwise, input the tag values Trunc( ) to ℬ and obtain the tag, yielding the truncated ciphertext of .
⊓ ⊔ 5 Alpha-MAC and Pelican
We briefly reiterate here two instantiations. They both use AES [21, 22] as underlying block cipher, allowing for keys of 16, 24 or 32 bytes. They both were claimed to satisfy the security claims for iterative MAC functions for the three key lengths of AES with ℓ ≤ 128 and ℓ = 120.
Alpha-MAC
The Alpha-MAC iteration function consists of a single round: = 1 [9] . The message block length 
Pelican
The iteration function of Pelican consists of four rounds ( = 4). The message block length ℓ is equal to 128 bits. The injection layout copies the message block to the first round key and resets the three remaining round keys to zero. The final block of the padded message is simply XORed to the state prior to the output transformation.
Pelican has roughly the same performance as Alpha-MAC, but uses a simpler injection layout. The security analysis of Pelican can be based on existing security analysis of AES to a much larger extent than is the case for Alpha-MAC.
Internal collisions in Alred
In order to motivate the claimed ℓ of an Alred design, we need to analyse how difficult it is to construct internal collisions.
Pairs of message sequences and their colliding probability
When we apply the standard definitions and results from differential cryptanalysis for block ciphers on Alred constructions, it is easy to get confused, because of the mismatch of inputs. Namely, the message blocks that are to be MACed, are applied via the "key input" of the round transformation of the block cipher, and the state applied via the "message input" of the round transformation, depends on the MAC key, which is unknown to the attacker (see Figure 2 ).
Therefore, we propose to discuss internal-collision based attacks on Alred constructions using When all states occur with the same probability, the CP of a PMS corresponds to the probability that the PMS will cause an internal collision. Note that in a practical scenario, the value of depends on the MAC key, and a possible prefix common to both messages. Since the value of 0 is obtained by 0 = Enc( , 0), typically 0 does not have a uniform distribution.
However, for a secure block cipher it is generally believed to be hard to determine the probability of any given value of 0 . Hence, making the assumption that 0 has a uniform distribution, is a commonly accepted practice. Clearly, both concepts PMS and CP are strongly related to concepts used in the differential cryptanalysis of block ciphers. We conclude that the security analysis of Alpha-MAC given in [9] is incomplete. In the meanwhile, Pelican has been introduced. We will therefore not try to complete the security analysis of Alpha-MAC, but instead concentrate our efforts on the new design.
Types of internal collisions

Expected maximum CP
In this section, we derive the distribution of the maximum CP of pairs of message sequences when the iteration function is a uniformly distributed random permutation and the initial value of the state is a uniformly distributed random variable.
We make the derivation for three particular cases: a two-block extinguishing differential, a single-block fixed point and a PMS consisting of a 2-block member and a 3-block member. Subsequently we generalize and draw conclusions.
Two-block extinguishing differential
We start with the case of two-block extinguishing differentials, because it is the most similar to a differential in a block cipher. The members of the PMS are 0 || 1 and * 0 || * 1 . The characteristic function of this PMS is:
By a change of variable ′ = ⊕ 0 , the characteristic function can be converted to
It follows that the CN only depends on the initial difference 0 ⊕ * 0 and the final difference 1 ⊕ * 1 . This characteristic function has a symmetry property: ( ⊕ 0 ⊕ * 0 ) = ( ). It follows that the CN of an extinguishing differential is always even. In fact, computing the distribution of the CP of this PMS corresponds to computing the distribution of the differential probability of the
and is a random transformation, then CN/2 has a binomial distribution [23, 24] . The Poisson distribution with = 1/2 is a good approximation for this distribution. When is a random permutation, the different values are not independent.
However, if 1 ∕ = * 1 , then this difference can be ignored for all practical values of [23] . We now consider the distribution of
If we assume that the CN values are independent, then this is the distribution of the maximum 
where is the binary logarithm of the total number of variables. For the case considered here we have = 2 and = 1/2.
Single-block fixed point
The first member of the PMS consists now of a single block 0 , while the second member is the 
Summary
The expected value of the maximum CN value over all PMS with members of given lengths , depends only on these lengths and the fact whether the PMS is an extinguishing differential or not. We have: Using equation (7) we can now compute the maximum collision probability for PMS with members of given length + . We count the cost of applying a PMS by the number of blocks it contains. Then given an attack budget of a fixed number of blocks , the success probability is given by the total number of pairs /( + ) times the collision probability CP of the PMS. So, when deciding whether to take a PMS with a short or large length, the collision probability divided by the length of the PMS is relevant. Figure 3 plots the expected maximum collision probability
[CN] (scaled by a factor 2 128 ) divided by the number of blocks of PMS as a function of the total number of blocks of the PMS for the case of 128-bit blocks. Clearly the best choice is to use fixed points and extinguishing differentials of a small number of blocks.
In this attack scenario we only consider internal collisions between pairs of messages that exhibit the given PMS. In general, when applying messages, for each of the ( − 1)/2 pairs of messages among them, there may be an internal collision. This also favors short PMS because this allows to have more messages and hence more pairs.
The collision-resistance of Pelican
We claim that Pelican has an internal-collision resistance corresponding to ℓ = 120. In this section we motivate this choice. Nicer would be to be able to prove this claim, but we believe that this would require an extensive additional research effort.
In our opinion, two-block extinguishing differentials are the only case where the structural properties of the iteration function are relevant. When PMS become longer, the structural properties tend to become less important. In asymmetric PMS, including fixed points, structural properties are also less important. Hence we will argue here that there exist no two-block extinguishing differentials with DP ≥ 2 −119 . [22] . A plateau trail with height ℎ has 2 ℎ right pairs for a fraction EDP2 128−ℎ of the expanded keys and zero right pairs otherwise. Almost all trails over 4 rounds of AES are plateau trails, where the vast majority have ℎ = 1 [27, 28] .
As a first approximation, assume that all trails have ℎ = 1. Then, making some standard independence assumptions, we obtain that the distribution of the DP values of a differential ( ′ , ′ ) can be approximated by a Poisson distribution with = 2 127 EDP( ′ , ′ ). The maximum over large sets of such differentials with some given EDP can be estimated using (7). If we make the approximation that all 2 256 differentials have the estimated EDP value 4 × 2 −128 , then we obtain an estimate for the maximum DP, that we believe to be on the safe side. Solving (7) with = 2 results in a DP value of 136 ⋅ 2 −128 ≈ 2 −121 .
The trails with ℎ > 1 increase the maximum DP of differentials compared to what is predicted by the Poisson distribution. For two-round trails, we proved that heights up to 5 occur [27] . The maximal height of trails over larger numbers of rounds remains a topic of further research. As long as the increase caused by deviations from the Poisson distribution results in a DP increase less than 2 −119 − 136 ⋅ 2 −128 = 376 ⋅ 2 −128 , the capacity claim remains upright.
Conclusions
We conclude by summarizing the main advantages of the Alred construction in general, and Pelican in particular.
Performance: One iteration of Pelican corresponds roughly to 4 rounds of AES, hence roughly 4/10 of an AES-128 encryption. It is actually better because the XORs with 0 in the round key addition don't have to be implemented. Hence, for long messages Pelican is more than a factor 2.5 faster than AES-128 encryption.
Style: The construction is simple, and doesn't require much more than calls to the round transformation of the block cipher. A software implementation of Pelican benefits from hardware accelerated AES instructions. DPA countermeasures implemented for AES can be used to protect Pelican.
Provability:
The construction comes with security proofs, without relying on nonces. 
